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BACK TO THE FUTURE: UNITED STATES V. JONES 
RESUSCITATES PROPERTY LAW CONCEPTS IN 
FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Nancy Forster 
Calling the Fourth Amendment "an embarrassment," noted 
scholar Akhil Reed Amar had this to say about United States 
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area of the law: 
Much of what the Supreme Court has said in the last 
half century-that the Amendment generally calls for 
warrants and probable cause for all searches and 
seIzures, and exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence-is initially plausible but ultimately 
misguided. As a matter of text, history, and plain old 
common sense, these three pillars of modem Fourth 
Amendment case law are hard to support; in fact, 
today's Supreme Court does not really support them. 
Except when it does. Warrants are not required-
unless they are. All searches and seizures must be 
grounded in probable cause-but not on Tuesdays. 
And unlawfully seized evidence must be excluded 
whenever five votes say so. . .. The result is a vast 
jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely 
complex and contradictory, but often perverse .... ' 
What is most interesting about this acerbic summation of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that it was written in 1994; 
almost twenty years and 130 Fourth Amendment Supreme Court 
opinions ago. 2 If Professor Amar was embarrassed by Supreme 
1. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 
757-58 (1994) (footnote omitted). 
2. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) 
(holding that invasive searches conducted by county jails did not violate 
detainee's Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012) (holding that Government's attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, 
and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a 
search under the Fourth Amendment); Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. 
Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (holding that a strip search of a student based on 
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Court opinions on the subject in 1994, he must certainly be 
apoplectic today in light of the Court's recent decision in United 
States v. Jones. 3 Writing for the Court in Jones, Justice Scalia 
resuscitated property law concepts to define a "search" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, insisting the concepts 
had never died.4 This insistence will no doubt come as a 
surprise to many in the legal community, including fellow 
Supreme Court justices, who thought the use of property law, 
and more specifically the doctrine of trespass, in the Fourth 
Amendment context had been overruled by the Court in Katz v. 
United States. 5 A litigant's reliance on a trespass theory post-
Katz was routinely tossed aside as no longer viable.6 The Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals recently summed it up best: 
principal's suspicion that student was distributing drugs violated the Fourth 
Amendment); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 364 (2009) (holding that 
suspicionless search of California parolee did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (holding that 
warrantless search of probationer's home was authorized by a condition of his 
parole was reasonable as required by the Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that warrantless use of thennal imaging 
device to measure heat emanating from home violated the Fourth Amendment); 
Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999) (holding that Fourth Amendment 
permitted warrantless seizure of vehicle from public space with probable cause 
to believe it was forfeitable contraband); United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 
(1998) (holding that officers executing search warrant did not violate Fourth 
Amendment when they broke garage window during court of "no-knock" entry 
into Defendant's residence); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (holding 
that Fourth Amendment does not require that detainee be "free to go" before 
his consent to search will be deemed voluntary). 
3. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
4. Id. at 950 ("At bottom, we must 'assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy 
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.' 
As explained, for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to 
embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (,persons, 
houses, papers, and effects') it enumerates.") (citation omitted). 
5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ('''We conclude that the 
underpinnings of Olmstead [v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, (1928)] and 
Goldman [v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, (1942)] have been so eroded by our 
subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no longer 
be regarded as controlling. "'); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 
(1984) ("[P]recedents such as Katz v. United States . .. overrul[e] the 'trespass' 
doctrine."); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 269 (1969) (Fortas, J., 
dissenting) (stating Katz "administered the formal coup de grace to the 
moribund doctrine of Olmstead'). 
6. See, e.g., Bentz v. City of Kendallville, 577 F.3d 776, 782 (7th Cir. 2009) 
("[A]lthough the Supreme Court has often expressed concern for protecting 
'the sanctity of a man's home,' it has, with equal vigor, emphasized that 'the 
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The Jones decision represents a significant change in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence unanticipated by any 
of the circuit courts which had faced the question of 
whether use of a GPS unit amounted to a Fourth 
Amendment search. Courts and commentators had 
understood that in [Katz]... "the Supreme Court 
replaced the trespass doctrine with the pnvacy 
doctrine.,,7 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places .... ' Thus, the Supreme Court 
long ago abandoned the 'trespass' doctrine .... ") (citations omitted); United 
States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Although originally 
viewed as protecting property rights of individuals, the Supreme Court has now 
rejected the idea that fourth amendment coverage turns on 'arcane distinctions 
developed in property ... law."') (citation omitted); United States v. Jackson, 
588 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1979) ("In finding an illegal search despite the 
absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth, the Court rejected the 
trespass doctrine applied in previous cases and held that an individual is 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection whenever he has a 'reasonable 
expectation of privacy. "'); United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th 
Cir. 1977) ("We recognize that the Supreme Court in [Katz] stated that the 
underpinnings of Goldman and Olmstead had been so eroded that the 'trespass' 
doctrine could no longer be deemed as controlling.") (citation omitted); Dancy 
v. United States, 390 F.2d 370, 372 (5th Cir. 1968) (noting that the cases 
delineating the trespass theory "were expressly overruled" by Katz); United 
States v. Missler, 414 F.2d 1293, 1298 (4th Cir. 1969) ("Overruling the 
'trespass' doctrine announced in [Olmstead], and [Goldman], the Court 
observed that Katz sought to exclude the 'uninvited ear' and noted that 'the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."') (citations omitted); United 
States v. Hagarty, 388 F.2d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 1968) ("The trespass and 
physical intrusion doctrines were rejected in Katz. "). 
7. United States v. Fisher, Nos. 2:1O-cr-28, 2:IO-cr-32, 2012 WL 6913429, at *9 
(W.D. Mich. 2012) (citation omitted). The federal District Court in Hawaii 
similarly interpreted the lower courts' understanding of Katz in United States v. 
Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1194 (D. Haw. 2012), where it noted: 
That Jones now makes clear that the Fourth Amendment 
reasonable expectation of privacy test augments, but does 
not displace, concepts of trespass does not directly address 
the law as understood in 2009. In fact, [United States v.] 
McIver [186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999)], in the context of 
the placement of the GPS device, drew a clear distinction 
between trespass law and a Fourth Amendment reasonable 
expectation of privacy: "Assuming arguendo that the 
officers committed a trespass in walking into McIver's open 
driveway, he has failed to demonstrate that he had a 
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Part I of this article will trace the early use of property law in 
Fourth Amendment cases involving surreptitiously gathered 
information. Part II will examine Katz and post-Katz cases that 
changed the focus in defining a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment from property rights to privacy rights. Part 
III of the article will analyze the Jones case with particular 
emphasis on its revival of and reliance on the trespass doctrine 
instead of the privacy emphasis created in Katz and what it may 
portend. 
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE: THE 
TRESPASS THEORY 
One of the earliest cases to interpret the Fourth Amendment 
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures is Boyd 
v. United States.8 Boyd was accused of fraud for failing to pay 
required duties on thirty-five cases of imported plate glass, and 
the government, over Boyd's objection, sought forfeiture of the 
goods.9 During the forfeiture proceeding, it became necessary 
for the government to prove the quantity and value of the glass, 
and in order to do so, the government introduced invoices. 10 
Those invoices had been obtained by the government pursuant 
to an order of the district court directing Boyd to produce 
them. II Boyd challenged the constitutionality of the statute 
permitting a court to order production of documents claiming it 
violated the Fourth Amendment. 12 The issue before the U.S. 
Supreme Court devolved to: 
[Whether] a search and seizure, or, what is equivalent 
thereto, a compulsory production of a man's private 
papers, to be used in evidence against him in a 
proceeding to forfeit his property for alleged fraud 
against the revenue laws-is such a proceeding for 
such a purpose an 'unreasonable search and seizure' 
legitimate expectation of privacy cognizable under the 
Fourth Amendment in this portion of his property. 
Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 1194 (quoting United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 
1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
8. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
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within the meaning of the fourth amendment of the 
constitution [ .] 13 
Hearkening back to British use of writs of assistance and 
general warrants against the colonists,14 the Court explained the 
practices that animated the Fourth Amendment. 
The practice had obtained in the colonies of issuing 
writs of assistance to the revenue officers, empowering 
them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for 
smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced 'the 
worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most 
destructive of English liberty and the fundamental 
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law 
book;' since they placed 'the liberty of every man in 
the hands of every petty officer.' This was in February, 
1761, in Boston, and the famous debate in which it 
occurred was perhaps the most prominent event which 
inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the 
oppressions of the mother country. . .. These things, 
and the events which took place in England 
immediately following the argument about writs of 
assistance in Boston, were fresh in the memories of 
those who achieved our independence and established 
our form of govemment. 15 
But it was the decision written by Lord Camden in Entick v. 
Carrington l6-condemning the entry of the private home of 
John Wilkes under the authority of a general warrant issued by 
the secretary of state for the search and seizure of papers that 
would support a claim of libel-that the Boyd Court found most 
persuasive on the subject. 
The great end for which men entered into society was 
to secure their property. That right is preserved sacred 
13. Id. at 622. 
14. The act that pennitted the issuance of writs of assistance, 13 & 14 Car. II. C. 
11, § 5, authorized the search "of ships and vessels, and persons found therein, 
for the purpose of finding goods ... on which the duties were not paid." Boyd, 
116 U.S. at 626-27. General warrants "authorized searches in any place, for 
any thing." Boyd, 116 U.S. at 641. 
15. Id.at625. 
16. Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tri. 1030 (1765). 
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and incommunicable in all instances where it has not 
been taken away or abridged by some public law for 
the good of the whole. The cases where this right of 
property is set aside by positive law are various. 
Distresses, executions, forfeitures, taxes, etc., are all of 
this description, wherein every man by common 
consent gives up that right for the sake of justice and 
the general good. By the laws of England, every 
invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a 
trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground 
without my license, but he is liable to an action, though 
the damage be nothing, which is proved by every 
declaration in trespass where the defendant is called 
upon to answer for bruising the grass and even 
treading upon the soil. I? 
[Vol. 42 
Thus, the Court held that while there was no literal trespass 
onto Boyd's property by the government, "any forcible and 
compulsory extortion of a man's ... private papers to be used as 
evidence to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his goods, is 
within the condemnation of [Entick].,,18 Further, the Court 
pointed out that the words of Lord Camden in Entick were 
"relied on as expressing the true doctrine on the subject of 
searches and seizures, and ... furnish[ ed] the true criteria of the 
reasonable and 'unreasonable' character of ... [searches and] 
seizures" referred to in the Fourth Amendment. 19 
Boyd was followed by Weeks v. United States. 20 Weeks was 
charged with using the mails to engage in a lottery enterprise. 21 
After arresting Weeks, state police and federal agents, without a 
search warrant, obtained the key to Weeks's home, entered it, 
searched it, and seized numerous papers and documents found 
inside.22 Those documents were the subject of a motion filed by 
Weeks for their return. 23 The trial court ruled that those seized 
documents not relevant to the trial had to be returned but those 
17. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626-27 (emphasis added). 
18. Id. at 630. 
19. Id. 
20. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
21. Id. at 386. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 387-89. 
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needed for trial could be introduced. 24 Finding that the 
appropriate remedy for violating the Fourth Amendment was 
exclusion of the seized evidence from use at trial, the Court 
elaborated on the illegal nature of the search and seizure 
conducted in the case: 
Resistance to [unreasonable searches and seizures] had 
established the principle which was enacted into the 
fundamental law in the Fourth Amendment, that a 
man's house was his castle and not to be invaded by 
any general authority to search and seize his goods and 
papers .... "The maxim that 'every man's house is his 
castle' is made a part of our constitutional law in the 
clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, 
and has always been looked upon as of high value to 
the citizen." "Accordingly ... no man's house can be 
forcibly opened, or he or his goods be carried away 
after it has thus been forced, except in cases of felony; 
and then the sheriff must be furnished with a warrant, 
and take great care lest he commit a trespass. This 
principle is jealously insisted upon.,,25 
The Court distinguished the cases relied upon by the 
government noting that in Weeks's case, police had engaged "in 
the wrongful invasion of the home of [a] citizen and the 
unwarranted seizure of his papers and property. ,,26 
The same property principles were applied to the defendant's 
place of business in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States /7 
where federal agents, without a warrant, entered the defendant's 
company and "made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and 
documents found there.,,28 The Court applied the Weeks 
decision and concluded that "knowledge gained by the 
Government's own wrong cannot be used by it .... ,,29 
The Supreme Court consistently interpreted a Fourth 




Id. at 388. It was not until 1961 that the Supreme Court ruled that the 
exclusionary rule would apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 389, 390. 
Id. at 394-98. 
27. Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
28. Id. at 390. 
29. /d. at 391-92. 
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looked to the conduct of the government to detennine whether 
or not a trespass had been committed.30 But the cases before the 
Court were rather simplistic and clear CUt. 31 They generally 
involved government agents breaking into a defendant's home 
or office, searching it, and seizing items of evidence, all without 
a warrant. 32 The cases required very little in the way of analysis 
by the Court as the wording of the Fourth Amendment clearly 
prohibited such conduct.33 But advancing technology soon 
permitted police to obtain evidence without breaking into the 
home of defendants. Thus, in 1928 the Court was confronted 
with a case involving evidence of private telephone 
conversations obtained by police, without a warrant, through the 
use of wiretapping. In Olmstead v. United States, the defendant 
was suspected of violating the National Prohibition Act. 34 
Police gathered evidence over a period of months by inserting 
small wires "along the ordinary telephone wires from the 
residences of four of the [defendants] and those leading from the 
chief office. The insertions were made without trespass upon 
any property of the defendants. They were made in the 
basement of the large office building. The taps from house lines 
30. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925) ("[I]t has always been 
assumed that one's house cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant. 
. .. The search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable 
and abhorrent to our laws."); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) 
("[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in 
their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. 
The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law."); 
Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 314-17 (1921) (stating that evidence 
"seized in the search of [Amos's] home by government agents without warrant 
of any kind, in plain violation of the Fourth ... Amendment[]" must be 
suppressed). 
31. See Agnello, 269 U.S. at 29-30; Amos, 255 U.S. at 315-16; Silverthorne 
Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 390; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 386 
(1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
32. See Agnello, 269 U.S. at 29-30; Amos, 255 U.S. at 315-16; Silverthorne 
Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 390; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386, overruled by Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
33. See Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30; Amos, 255 U.S. at 315-16; Silverthorne Lumber 
Co., 251 U.S. at 391-92; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. The Fourth Amendment 
provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
34. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (\928), overruled in part by Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (\967). 
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were made in the streets near the houses.,,35 Olmstead 
challenged the admissibility of the evidence arguing the 
wiretapping was an unconstitutional search within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
Constrained by the ruling in Weeks, requiring exclusion of 
evidence obtained through unlawful searches, in order to affIrm 
Olmstead's convictions, the Court had to conclude that the 
wiretapping was not a search.36 Over the vigorous dissent of 
four justices, the Court did precisely that. 
Justice Bradley, in the Boyd Case ... said that the ... 
Fourth Amendment ... [was] to be liberally construed 
to effect the purpose of the framers of the Constitution 
in the interest of liberty. But that cannot justify 
enlargement of the language employed beyond the 
possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, 
and effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure 
as to forbid hearing or sight. 
Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of 
telephone messages by making them, when intercepted, 
inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by 
direct legislation, and thus depart from the common 
law of evidence. But the courts may not adopt such a 
policy by attributing an enlarged and unusual meaning 
to the Fourth Amendment. The reasonable view is that 
one who installs in his house a telephone instrument 
with connecting wires intends to project his voice to 
those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his 
house, and messages while passing over them, are not 
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Here 
those who intercepted the projected voices were not in 
the house of either party to the conversation. 
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many 
federal decisions brought to our attention hold the 
Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a 
defendant, unless there has been an official search and 
seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or 
his tangible material effects or an actual physical 
35. Jd. at 456-57. 
36. Jd. at 466-68. 
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invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of 
making a seizure. 
We think, therefore, that the wiretapping here 
disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.3? 
[Vol. 42 
The Court did not disguise its opinion that the police conduct 
at issue was, perhaps, unscrupulous; however, the court found it 
more important that criminals be brought to justice.38 Indeed, in 
a rather blatant nod to the majority's perceived superior 
capabilities of law enforcement in such matters, the Court 
cautioned that "[i]n the absence of controlling legislation by 
Congress, those who realize the difficulties in bringing offenders 
to justice may well deem it wise that the exclusion of evidence 
should be confined to cases where rights under the Constitution 
would be violated by admitting it.,,39 Because there had been no 
trespass on Olmstead's property, there had been no search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. However, with 
advancing technology, the Olmstead holding became 
increasingly problematic.40 Indeed, Justice Brennan noted "that 
its authority has been steadily sapped by subsequent decisions of 
the Court .... "41 
In Goldman v. United States ,42 federal agents used "a 
detectaphone" placed against a partition wall to overhear 
conversations in the office next door where Goldman was 
meeting with other conspirators. The conversations were 
introduced into evidence, over objection, at Goldman's trial. In 
only two paragraphs, the Court turned aside Goldman's claim 
that his Fourth Amendment right to privacy had been violated. 
In asking us to hold that the information obtained was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and 
that its use at the trial was, therefore, banned by the 
Amendment, the petitioners recognize that they must 
37. !d. at 465-66. 
38. Id. at 468. "A standard which would forbid the reception of evidence, if 
obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by government officials, would 
make society suffer and give criminals greater immunity than has been known 
heretofore." Id. 
39. Id. 
40. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 458-59 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
41. Id. 
42. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
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reckon with our decision in [OlmsteadJ .... They 
argue that the case may be distinguished. The 
suggested ground of distinction is that the Olmstead 
case dealt with the tapping of telephone wires, and the 
court adverted to the fact that, in using a telephone, the 
speaker projects his voice beyond the confines of his 
home or office and, therefore, assumes the risk that his 
message may be intercepted. It is urged that where, as 
in the present case, one talks in his own office, and 
intends his conversation to be confined within the four 
walls of the room, he does not intend his voice shall go 
beyond those walls and it is not to be assumed he takes 
the risk of someone's use of a delicate detector in the 
next room. We think, however, the distinction is too 
nice for practical application of the Constitutional 
guarantee and no reasonable or logical distinction can 
be drawn between what federal agents did in the 
present case and state officers did in the Olmstead case. 
The petitioners ask us, if we are unable to distinguish 
[OlmsteadJ ... to overrule it. This we are unwilling to 
do. That case was the subject of prolonged 
consideration by this court. The views of the court, and 
of the dissenting justices, were expressed clearly and at 
length. To rehearse and reappraise the arguments pro 
and con, and the conflicting views exhibited in the 
opinions, would serve no good purpose. Nothing now 
can be profitably added to what was there said. It 
suffices to say that we adhere to the opinion there 
expressed.43 
Justice Murphy, in his dissent, was particularly troubled by the 
continued reliance on property law and the trespass doctrine. 44 
He noted: 
There was no physical entry in this case. But the search 
of one's home or office no longer requires physical 
entry, for science has brought forth far more effective 
devices for the invasion of a person's privacy than the 
direct and obvious methods of oppression which were 
43. Id. at 135-36 (citation omitted). 
44. Id. at 139 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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detested by our forebears and which inspired the Fourth 
Amendment.4s 
[Vol. 42 
A chink in the Olmstead annor appeared when Silverman v. 
United Statei6 reached the Court. There, federal agents used a 
"spike mike" to overhear conversations in Silvennan's home.47 
The instrument in question was a microphone with a 
spike about a foot long attached to it together with an 
amplifier, a power pack, and earphones. The officers 
inserted the spike under a baseboard in a second-floor 
room of the vacant house and into a crevice extending 
several inches into the party wall, until the spike hit 
something solid "that acted as a very good sounding 
board." The record clearly indicates that the spike 
made contact with a heating duct serving the house 
occupied by the petitioners thus converting their entire 
heating system into a conductor of sound.48 
The overheard conversations were introduced, over objection, 
into evidence at Silverman's trial for gambling offenses.49 
Noting the importance of the fact that the spike mike made 
contact with the "heating system, which was an integral part of 
[Silvennan's] premises,"so the Court concluded that this violated 
the Fourth Amendment because it was an "intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area."Sl Notwithstanding the many 
references to trespassing--e.g., "eavesdropping was 
accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration 
into the premises,,,s2 "unauthorized physical encroachment,,,53 
"physical invasion of premises,,,s4-the Court quizzically ended 
its opinion with the following language: 
Here, by contrast, the officers overheard the 
petitioners' conversations only by usurping part of the 
45. Id. 
46. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-12 (1961). 
47. Id. at 507. 
48. Id. at 506--07. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 511. 
51. Id. at 511-12. 
52. Id. at 509. 
53. Id. at 510. 
54. Id. 
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petitioners' house or office-a heating system which 
was an integral part of the premises occupied by the 
petitioners, a usurpation that was effected without their 
knowledge and without their consent. In these 
circumstances we need not pause to consider whether 
or not there was a technical trespass under the local 
property law relating to party walls. Inherent Fourth 
Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in 
terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property law. 55 
Thus, in a single opinion, the Court disavowed the application 
of property law concepts in Fourth Amendment cases while at 
the same time placed critical importance on the fact that the 
agents had physically intruded upon Silverman's premises 
without his consent.56 And thus began a steady shift away from 
property and trespass concepts in defining a search in Fourth 
Amendment cases and a turn toward privacy rights. 57 
A mere seven months before the landmark decision in Katz, 
the Court seemed to put to rest any notion that property law 
applies in Fourth Amendment analyses.58 In Warden v. 
Hayden,s9 the Court made the following pronouncement: 
The premise that property interests control the right of 
the Government to search and seize has been 
discredited. Searches and seizures may be 
"unreasonable" within the Fourth Amendment even 
though the Government asserts a superior property 
interest at common law. We have recognized that the 
principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the 
protection of privacy rather than property, and have 
increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers 
rested on property concepts.60 
However, the Court in Warden only added to the confusion 
when it stated that its decision in Silverthorne Lumber CO.,61 
decided in 1920, marked the escape from "the bounds of 
55. Id. at 511 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
56. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text. 
57. See discussion infra Part II. 
58. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920). 
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common law property limitations... when it became 
established that suppression might be sought during a criminal 
trial, and under circumstances which would not sustain an action 
in trespass or replevin.,,62 Of course, such a claim completely 
ignored the decisions in Goldman, Olmstead, Agnello, Hester, 
and Amos,63 all decided post-Silverthorne Lumber Co. and all 
relying on property law concepts. The claim in Warden, that 
property law concepts had long ago been discredited, only 
serves to reinforce Professor Amar's cogent observation that in 
this area of the law, the Court's decisions have resulted in "a 
vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely 
complex and contradictory, but often perverse.,,64 
II. DEFINING A SEARCH WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: FROM PROPERTY 
RIGHTS TO PRIV ACY RIGHTS 
A. The Katz Decision 
In 1967, police suspected that Charles Katz was engaging in a 
bookmaking operation and was using public telephones to 
transmit information in violation of federal law.65 Katz used a 
particular glass telephone booth from which to make many of 
his calls.66 Federal agents, unbeknownst to Katz, attached a 
listening device to the top of the telephone booth, which allowed 
them to overhear and record bookmaking conversations engaged 
in by Katz.67 At trial, Katz unsuccessfully objected, on Fourth 
Amendment grounds, to the introduction of the recordings. 68 
The issues that ultimately made their way to the United States 
Supreme Court were twofold: whether a telephone booth is a 
constitutionally protected area, and if so, whether physical 
intrusion into the booth is required before a Fourth Amendment 
challenge could be raised.69 The framing of the issues in this 
62. Warden, 387 U.S. at 304-05 (citation omitted). 
63. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, l34-36 (1942); Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 
30-33 (1925); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924); Amos v. 
United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315-17 (1921). 
64. Warden, 387 U.S. at 304-05; supra note 1, at 757-58. 
65. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348, 354 (1967). 
66. /d. at 352. 
67. /d. at 348-49. 
68. /d. 
69. /d. at 349-50. 
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manner seems perfectly reasonable in light of the cases 
discussed above. However, again proving Professor Amar's 
point, the Court chastised counsel as having framed the issues in 
a "misleading" manner.70 This is so, the Court stated, because: 
[T]his effort to decide whether or not a given "area," 
viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" 
deflects attention from the problem presented by this 
case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places. What a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection.71 
The Court specifically addressed the use of the trespass 
doctrine in this way: 
The Government contends, however, that the 
activities of its agents in this case should not be tested 
by Fourth Amendment requirements, for the 
surveillance technique they employed involved no 
physical penetration of the telephone booth from which 
the petitioner placed his calls. It is true that the 
absence of such penetration was at one time thought to 
foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry, for that 
Amendment was thought to limit only searches and 
seizures of tangible property. But "[t]he premise that 
property interests control the right of the Government 
to search and seize has been discredited." Thus, 
although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead 
that surveillance without any trespass and without the 
seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of 
the Constitution, we have since departed from the 
narrow view on which that decision rested. Indeed, we 
have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment 
governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but 
extends as well to the recording of oral statements 
overheard without any "technical trespass under . .. 
local property law." Once this much is acknowledged, 
and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment 
protects people-and not simply "areas "-against 
70. See id. at 352-53. 
71. /d. at 351. 
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unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear 
that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the 
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any 
given enclosure. 
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and 
Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent 
decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated 
can no longer be regarded as controlling. The 
Government's activities in electronically listening to 
and recording the petitioner's words violated the 
privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the 
telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and 
seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve 
that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the 
booth can have no constitutional significance.72 
[Vol. 42 
To a certain degree, the majority opinion in Katz remarkably 
reads as if the Court were annoyed that counsel on both sides 
had addressed the facts using a theory of trespass as applied to a 
"constitutionally protected area" as if such a theory had no 
precedents in Supreme Court case law. 73 Ironically, however, 
Justice Stewart who wrote for the majority in Katz, was also the 
architect of the majority opinion in Silverman, which held "[the] 
decision here does not tum upon the technicality of a trespass 
upon a party wall as a matter of local law. It is based upon the 
reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area.,,74 
72. Id. at 352-53 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) 
(citations omitted). 
73. Although the Court gave lip service in a single footnote to its prior references 
to "constitutionally protected areas," in the same footnote the Court dismissed 
reliance on such a standard stating, "It is true that this Court has occasionally 
described its conclusions in terms of 'constitutionally protected areas,' but we 
have never suggested that this concept can serve as a talismanic solution to 
every Fourth Amendment problem." See id. at 352 n.9 (citations omitted). 
74. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (emphasis added). It 
appears that introduction of the phrase "constitutionally protected area" in the 
context of Fourth Amendment cases was first introduced by Justice Stewart in 
the Silverman decision. See Charles H. Rogers, The Fourth Amendment and 
Evidence Obtained by a Government Agent's Trespass, 42 NEB. L. REv. 166, 
166-67 (1962) (explaining the Court's usage of the constitutionally protected 
area test as applied to the Fourth Amendment in Silverman). 
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Ultimately, the Court held that in order to conduct electronic 
surveillance, the government must, unless national security is at 
stake, obtain prior approval from a judge. 75 
[The government] argues that surveillance of a 
telephone booth should be exempted from the usual 
requirement of advance authorization by a magistrate 
upon a showing of probable cause. We cannot agree. 
Omission of such authorization "bypasses the 
safeguards provided by an objective predetermination 
of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less 
reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for 
the ... search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the 
familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment." And 
bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a 
search leaves individuals secure from Fourth 
Amendment violations "only in the discretion of the 
police." 
These considerations do not vanish when the search 
in question is transferred from the setting of a home, an 
office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth. 
Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he 
will remain free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The government agents here ignored "the 
procedure of antecedent justification . . . that is central 
to the Fourth Amendment," a procedure that we hold to 
be a constitutional precondition of the kind of 
electronic surveillance involved in this case. Because 
the surveillance here failed to meet that condition, and 
because it led to the petitioner's conviction, the 
judgment must be reversed. 76 
For the first time, the Court unequivocally held that electronic 
surveillance, even in the absence of a trespass, constituted a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 77 
75. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-59 & n.23. 
76. Id. at 358-59 (footnote omitted) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 
(1964». 
77. See id. at 353. That this was a clear repudiation of prior decisions that required 
a trespass in order to invoke the application of the Fourth Amendment was 
solidified by the Court's later decision in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 
247-48 (1969), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, (1987). In 
determining whether Katz should be subject to retroactive or prospective 
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It is difficult, however, to construe from the majority opinion a 
meaningful test for determining if conduct by the government 
constitutes a search, with or without trespassing. 78 This is 
probably why Justice Harlan felt the need to file a concurring 
opinion distilling such a test from the majority opinion. Justice 
Harlan wrote: 
I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold 
only (a) that an enclosed telephone booth is an area 
where, like a home, ... and unlike a field, ... a person 
has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation 
of privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical 
intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may 
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and 
(c) that the invasion of a constitutionally protected area 
by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, 
presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search 
warrant. 
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places." The 
question, however, is what protection it affords to those 
people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question 
requires reference to a "place." My understanding of 
the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that 
there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a man's 
home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects 
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he 
exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not 
"protected" because no intention to keep them to 
himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, 
conversations in the open would not be protected 
application, the Desist court held that "[w]hile decisions before Katz may have 
reflected growing dissatisfaction with the traditional tests of the constitutional 
validity of electronic surveillance, the Court consistently reiterated those tests 
and declined invitations to abandon them. However clearly our holding in Katz 
may have been foreshadowed, it was a clear break with the past, and we are 
thus compelled to decide whether its application should be limited to the 
future." Desist, 394 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
78. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
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against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy 
under the circumstances would be unreasonable .... 
The critical fact in this case is that "[0 Jne who 
occupies it, [a telephone booth J shuts the door behind 
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is 
surely entitled to assume" that his conversation is not 
being intercepted. . .. The point is not that the booth is 
'accessible to the public' at other times, ... but that it 
is a temporarily private place whose momentary 
occupants" expectations of freedom from intrusion are 
recognized as reasonable. 79 
Justice Harlan's test certainly provided more guidance than 
the majority opinion, and turned the focus to privacy interests 
rather than property interests. Post-Katz Supreme Court cases 
reflected this change in focus. 8o 
B. The Advance a/Technology Post-Katz 
The focus on privacy rights could not have come at a more 
fortuitous time as technology began to advance beyond the 
relatively benign eavesdropping techniques used prior to Katz, 
i.e., the detectaphone in Goldman and the spike mike in 
Silverman. 81 Many of the pre-Katz techniques used by police 
79. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted). 
80. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1984) (holding that 
petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields on his own 
property notwithstanding the trespass by government agents to view the open 
field); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980) (holding that 
petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a purse 
belonging to another even though he admitted that he owned the drugs found 
within the purse); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979), 
superseded by statute, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (holding that petitioner had no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers he dialed as it is generally 
known that the numbers one dials are transferred to the telephone company 
who has facilities to record the numbers). 
81. Compare Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961) (involving the 
use of a spike mike); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942) 
(involving the use of a detectaphone), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967), with discussion infra Part II.B (noting the technology used in 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (involving the use of a thermal-
imaging device); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (involving the 
use of aerial surveillance); Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 
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required some type of physical intrusion and posed no real 
difficulty in concluding it was a search by relying on property 
rights. This is not to say that the focus on privacy rights created 
an easy resolution when addressing advancing technology and 
its effect on the Fourth Amendment.82 While it may, in most 
cases, be relatively easy to discern whether or not one has 
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, it is no easy task 
to determine whether or not that expectation is one that society 
would recognize as reasonable. 83 In other words, precisely who 
is this "society"? The Harlan test presumes a homogenous 
society that any judge, at any time, could easily channel when 
making a determination that an expectation of privacy is one 
society would consider reasonable. 84 But the test actually 
generates far more questions than it answers and leaves the 
societal reasonableness of an expectation of privacy at the mercy 
of the speed with which technology is put into general use. 85 
The following cases demonstrate the advance in technology and 
the Court's efforts to apply the Katz test to that technology. 
United States v. Knotts concerned the placement of a beeper 
device in a five-gallon container of chloroform, which was then 
tracked to Knotts' property. 86 Government officials had reason 
to believe that the chloroform was being used to produce 
methamphetamine and other illicit drugs.87 The government 
agents followed the truck where the chloroform was placed by a 
co-conspirator. 88 It was ultimately taken to Knotts. Based on 
(1986) (involving the use of aerial photography); United States v. Karo, 468 
U.S. 705, 708 (1984) (involving the use of a beeper); United States v. Knotts, 
460 U.S. 276,277 (1983) (involving the use ofa beeper)). 
82. See generally Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth 
Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. LJ. 51, 72 (2002) 
(explaining the failings of the Katz decision as applied to advancing technology 
and its impact on the Fourth Amendment). 
83. In later cases the Court notes that an expectation of privacy is "reasonable" 
when it is consistent with "widely shared social expectations." Georgia v. 
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006). The Court has stated that there is "no 
talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that society is 
prepared to accept as reasonable," O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 
(1987) (plurality opinion), and simply measures the reasonableness in terms of 
"the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share." Minnesota v. Olson, 
495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990). 
84. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
85. See id. at 361-62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
86. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
87. Id. at 278. 
88. ld. 
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this tracking information, as well as other details, the 
government was able to secure a search warrant for the property, 
and upon execution, found a drug lab. 89 Upon his arrest and 
trial, Knotts challenged the monitoring of the beeper on Fourth 
Amendment grounds.90 When the case reached the United 
States Supreme Court, the Court held that no search or seizure 
had occurred when monitoring the beeper specifically because: 
A person travelling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his movements from one place to another. When 
[the co-defendant] travelled over the public streets he 
voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the 
fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a 
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, 
and the fact of his final destination when he exited 
from public roads onto private property.91 
Citing the "limited use" of the beeper and the fact that it did 
not reveal "information as to the movement of the drum within 
the cabin," the Court concluded that there had been no search. 92 
Significantly, the Court held that nothing in the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits the government from "augmenting the 
sensory facilities bestowed upon them at birth with such 
enhancement as science and technology afforded them. ,,93 
One year after the decision in Knotts, the Court again 
addressed the validity of the government's use of a beeper in 
United States v. Karo. 94 After receiving a tip that Karo and his 
cohorts would be using ether to extract cocaine from clothing 
imported into the United States, agents placed a beeper into a 
can of ether and monitored its movements over a period of 
several weeks.95 During that time, the can was moved from 
commercial storage lockers and ultimately taken to the residence 
89. ld. at 279. 
90. ld. at 281-82 (emphasis added). 
91. ld. at 281-82 (emphasis added). 
92. ld. at 284-85. Because it had not been raised below, the Court refused to 
address the question whether or not placing the beeper into the container, as 
opposed to simply monitoring it, constituted a search. See id. at n.** 
93. ld. at 282. 
94. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708-11 (1984). 
95. ld. at 708-10. 
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of one of the defendants.96 Agents confirmed the presence of the 
can in the residence through use of the beeper device and 
obtained a warrant to search the residence. 97 The search 
revealed cocaine and laboratory equipment used in the 
extraction process.98 The government asserted that the case was 
controlled by Knotts and that no search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment had occurred because agents, through 
visual observation, could easily have verified that the can was 
carried into the home.99 Turning aside this reasoning, the Court 
held: 
In this case, had a DEA agent thought it useful to enter 
the Taos residence to verify that the ether was actually 
in the house and had he done so surreptitiously and 
without a warrant, there is little doubt that he would 
have engaged in an unreasonable search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. For purposes of 
the Amendment, the result is the same where, without a 
warrant, the Government surreptitiously employs an 
electronic device to obtain information that it could not 
have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage 
of the house. The beeper tells the agent that a 
particular article is actually located at a particular time 
in the private residence and is in the possession of the 
person or persons whose residence is being watched. 
Even if visual surveillance has revealed that the article 
to which the beeper is attached has entered the house, 
the later monitoring not only verifies the officers' 
observations but also establishes that the article 
remains on the premises. Here, for example, the beeper 
was monitored for a significant period after the arrival 
of the ether in Taos and before the application for a 
warrant to search. 
The monitoring of an electronic device such as a 
beeper is, of course, less intrusive than a full-scale 
search, but it does reveal a critical fact about the 
interior of the premises that the Government is 
extremely interested in knowing and that it could not 
have otherwise obtained without a warrant. The case is 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 709-10. 
98. Jd. at 713-16. 
99. See id. at 713-16. 
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thus not like Knotts, for there the beeper told the 
authorities nothing about the interior of Knotts' cabin. 
The infonnation obtained in Knotts was "voluntarily 
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look ... "; here, as 
we have said, the monitoring indicated that the beeper 
was inside the house, a fact that could not have been 
visually verified. 
We cannot accept the Government's contention that it 
should be completely free from the constraints of the 
Fourth Amendment to detennine by means of an 
electronic device, without a warrant and without 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a 
particular article-or a person, for that matter-is in an 
individual's home at a particular time. Indiscriminate 
monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from 
public view would present far too serious a threat to 
privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some 
sort of Fourth Amendment oversight. 100 
Thus, the critical difference between Knotts and Karo is that 
the infonnation revealed by monitoring the beeper in Karo, 
unlike in Knotts, could not have been learned through visual 
observation even if that observation were enhanced with 
technology. 101 
It is doubtful that anyone would have predicted that the 
Court's reference in Knotts to augmentation of sensory facilities 
with "science and technology," would include aerial 
surveillance. Nevertheless, a mere three years after the decision 
in Knotts, the Court concluded that aerial surveillance did not 
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 102 In 
California v. Ciraolo, officers received an anonymous tip that 
Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his backyard. 103 The officers 
attempted to view the plants from the ground level but were 
unable to do so because of a six-foot high outer fence 
surrounding a ten-foot high inner fence constructed around the 
area. 104 Officers secured a private plane that flew over the yard 
100. Id. at 715-16 (footnote omitted). 
IOJ. Id. at 713-15. 
102. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207-08 (1986). 
103. Id. at 209. 
104. Id. 
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at a navigable air space of 1,000 feet. 105 The officers onboard, 
using a standard 35-mm camera, photographed the plants and 
subsequently used the photographs, inter alia, to obtain a search 
warrant. 106 Execution of the warrant resulted in the seizure of 
marijuana plants. l07 Focusing on the second prong of Katz, that 
is, the reasonableness of one's subjective expectation of privacy, 
the Court held: 
In an age where private and commercial flight in the 
public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for 
respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were 
constitutionally protected from being observed with the 
naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet. The Fourth 
Amendment simply does not require the police 
traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain 
a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the 
naked eye. 108 
The Court's focus on the type of surveillance used by police 
misses the point entirely. The focus instead should have been on 
those privacy interests that a free society would deem reasonable 
and not on what type of technology could be used to easily 
overcome that interest in privacy. 
The analysis used in Ciraolo was also applied in its 
companion case of Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, where 
agents of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sought to 
conduct a second inspection of the sprawling 2,000 acre facility 
owned by Dow Chemical. 109 The agents had earlier conducted 
an on-site inspection with Dow's consent. The second request 
was denied by Dow.llo Without seeking an administrative 
search warrant, the EPA agents hired an aerial photographer 
using "the finest precision aerial camera available" to film "a 
great deal more than the human eye could ever see."lll Dow 
sought, and was awarded, injunctive relief preventing further 
photography of its facilities. 112 The court of appeals reversed 
lOS. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 209-10. 
108. Id. at 212-15. 
109. Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986). 
110. Id. 
Ill. Id. at 229-30. 
112. Id. at 230. 
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finding that Dow had a subjective expectation of privacy in its 
ground-level operations, but because Dow had taken no similar 
precautions to preclude aerial observation, there was no 
subjective expectation of privacy. 113 Among other arguments 
made in the Supreme Court, Dow contended that "EPA's use of 
aerial photography was a 'search' of an area that, 
notwithstanding the large size of the plant, was within an 
'industrial curtilage' rather than an 'open field,' and that it had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from such photography 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.,,1l4 Finding that no search 
under the Fourth Amendment had taken place, the Court held: 
Oliver recognized that in the open field context, "the 
public and police lawfully may survey lands from the 
air." Here, EPA was not employing some unique 
sensory device that, for example, could penetrate the 
walls of buildings and record conversations in Dow's 
plants, offices, or laboratories, but rather a 
conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera 
commonly used in mapmaking. The Government 
asserts it has not yet enlarged the photographs to any 
significant degree, but Dow points out that simple 
magnification permits identification of objects such as 
wires as small as 112-inch in diameter. 
It may well be, as the Government concedes, that 
surveillance of private property by using highly 
sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally 
available to the public, such as satellite technology, 
might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant. 
But the photographs here are not so revealing of 
intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns. 
Although they undoubtedly give EPA more detailed 
information than naked-eye views, they remain limited 
to an outline of the facility's buildings and equipment. 
The mere fact that human vision is enhanced 
somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give rise 
to constitutional problems. An electronic device to 
penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and record 
confidential discussions of chemical formulae or other 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 232-33. 
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trade secrets would raise very different and far more 
serious questions; other protections such as trade secret 
laws are available to protect commercial activities from 
private surveillance by competitors. I 15 
[Vol. 42 
As noted by the dissenting opinion, the rationale employed by 
the majority to conclude that no search had occurred completely 
ignored the fundamental basis of Katz. I 16 "Katz measures Fourth 
Amendment rights by reference to the privacy interests that a 
free society recognizes as reasonable, not by reference to the 
method of surveillance used in the particular case. If the Court's 
observations were to become the basis of a new Fourth 
Amendment standard that would replace the rule in Katz, 
privacy rights would be seriously at risk as technological 
advances become generally disseminated and available in our 
society.,,117 
The irrationality of the Court's interpretation of what is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy reached its nadir when four 
justices applied its holding in Ciraolo to police flying a 
helicopter over a roofed greenhouse at a level of 400 feet in 
Florida v. Riley. I 18 The area surveyed by the police was 
described: 
A greenhouse was located 10 to 20 feet behind the 
mobile home. Two sides of the greenhouse were 
enclosed. The other two sides were not enclosed but 
the contents of the greenhouse were obscured from 
view from surrounding property by trees, shrubs, and 
the mobile home. The greenhouse was covered by 
corrugated roofing panels, some translucent and some 
opaque. At the time relevant to this case, two of the 
panels, amounting to approximately 10% of the roof 
area, were mIssmg. A wire fence surrounded the 
mobile home and the greenhouse, and the property was 
posted with a "DO NOT ENTER" sign.119 
115. ld. at 238-39 (footnote omitted). 
116. ld. at 251 (Powell, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
117. ld. 
118. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,447-49 (1989). 
119. ld. at 448. 
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After receiving a tip that marijuana was being grown in the 
greenhouse, police flew a helicopter over the area at a height of 
400 feet. Citing Ciraoio, the Court held: 
Any member of the public could legally have been 
flying over Riley's property in a helicopter at the 
altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley's 
greenhouse. The police officer did no more. This is 
not to say that an inspection of the curtilage of a house 
from an aircraft will always pass muster under the 
Fourth Amendment simply because the plane is within 
the navigable airspace specified by law. But it is of 
obvious importance that the helicopter in this case was 
not violating the law, and there is nothing in the record 
or before us to suggest that helicopters flying at 400 
feet are sufficiently rare in this country to lend 
substance to respondent's claim that he reasonably 
anticipated that his greenhouse would not be subject to 
observation from that altitude. 120 
The dissenters in this case used various suitable terms to 
describe the plurality's holding that because police had a right to 
be where they were and because any member of the public could 
fly overhead in a helicopter, an expectation of privacy in a 
covered area within the curtilage of one's home was not 
reasonable: "disingenuous,,,121 "unfortunate,,,122 "remarkable,,,123 
"curious," 124 "misguided,,,125 "incredible," 126 "disconcerting," 127 
and "puzzling." 128 
The unsound reasoning of the plurality opinion in Riley is only 
highlighted by the Court's later effort to distinguish it in Bond v. 
United States. 129 In Bond, a border patrol agent boarded a bus 
after it had stopped at a rest area.13o Border Patrol Agent Cantu 
120. Id. at 451-52. 
121. Id. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
122. Id. at 46l. 
123. Id. at 458 n.l, 463. 
124. Id. at 458. 
125. Id. at 459. 
126. Id. at 460 n.2. 
127. Id. at 46l. 
128. Id. at 462. 
129. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000). 
130. Id. at 335. 
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boarded the bus "to check the immigration status of its 
passengers."l3l When Agent Cantu began to walk from the rear 
of the bus to the front, he "squeezed the soft luggage which 
passengers had placed in the overhead storage space above the 
seats."\32 As Agent Cantu did so, he felt a "brick-like object" in 
a bag belonging to Bond.133 After Bond admitted that the bag 
belonged to him, he agreed to allow Cantu to open it. 134 Upon 
doing so, Agent Cantu discovered a "brick" of 
methamphetamine and arrested Bond. 135 When the Bond case 
reached the Supreme Court, the government argued, relying on 
Ciraolo, that "by exposing his bag to the public, [Bond] lost a 
reasonable expectation that his bag would not be physically 
manipulated.,,136 The Court held, "Ciraolo and Riley are 
different from this case because they involved only visual, as 
opposed to tactile, observation. Physically invasive inspection is 
simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection."137 Thus, 
police may employ an airplane or helicopter pilot to fly over 
one's home and, using high powered equipment, take 
photographs that may reveal intimate activities within the 
curtilage of the home, and should a window be uncovered, those 
within the home;138 but they best not touch one's luggage kept in 
an overhead compartment on a public bus. 
The forward march of science and technology and its 
consequent effect on privacy rights came under closer scrutiny 
in Kyllo v. United States, 139 where the Court confronted the 
question of what, if any, "limits there are upon this power of 
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy."14o 
Federal agents suspected Kyllo of growing marijuana inside his 
residence. 141 Because high-powered lights generating copious 
amounts of heat are needed for growing the plants, police 
131. /d. 
132. Jd. 
133. Jd. at 335-36. 
134. Id. 
135. Jd. 
136. Id. at 337. 
137. Id. 
138. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 
(200 I), noted that "the technology enabling human flight has exposed to public 
view (and hence, we have said, to official observation) uncovered portions of 
the house and its curtilage that once were private." Id. at 34. 
139. Id. at 33-34. 
140. Id. at 34. 
141. ld.at29. 
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compared Kyllo's electrical bills with those of his neighbors and 
confirmed that they were excessive. 142 To further confirm their 
suspicions, agents used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal 
imager to scan Kyllo's home as well as his neighbors' homes. 143 
The thermal imager was directed at the homes from inside an 
agent's car parked on the public street. l44 The scan "detect[s] 
infrared radiation" not visible to the naked eye. 145 The scan 
lasted only a few minutes. 146 It showed "that the roof over the 
garage and a side wall of [Kyllo's] home were relatively hot 
compared to the rest of the home and substantially warmer than 
neighboring homes .... ,,147 
Using this information, agents obtained a search warrant and 
discovered a marijuana growing operation. 148 The government 
contended before the Court that the use of the thermal imaging 
device from a public vantage point did not constitute a search as 









The Fourth Amendment's protection of the home has 
never been tied to measurement of the quality or 
quantity of information obtained. In Silverman, for 
example, we made clear that any physical invasion of 
the structure of the home, "by even a fraction of an 
inch," was too much, and there is certainly no 
exception to the warrant requirement for the officer 
who barely cracks open the front door and sees nothing 
but the nonintimate rug on the vestibule floor. In the 
home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, 
because the entire area is held safe from prying 
government eyes. Thus, in Karo, the only thing 
detected was a can of ether in the home; and in Arizona 
v. Hicks, the only thing detected by a physical search 
that went beyond what officers lawfully present could 
observe in "plain view" was the registration number of 
a phonograph turntable. These were intimate details 
Id. at 29-30. 
Id. 
Id. at 27, 30. 
Id. at 29. 
Id. at 30. 
Id. at 30. 
Id. 
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because they were details of the home, just as was the 
detail of how warm--or even how relatively warm-
Kyllo was heating his residence. 149 
[Vol. 42 
One troubling aspect of the decision in Kyllo concerns the 
Court's apparent willingness to conclude that no search occurs 
when the technology used by the government is also in general 
public use. ISO The Court reaffirms the sanctity of the home and 
acknowledges the clear existence of an expectation of privacy in 
one's home. 
We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws "a 
firm line at the entrance to the house," . . .. That line, 
we think, must be not only firm but also bright-which 
requires clear specification of those methods of 
surveillance that require a warrant. While it is certainly 
possible to conclude from the videotape of the thermal 
imaging that occurred in this case that no "significant" 
compromise of the homeowner's privacy has occurred, 
we must take the long view, from the original meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment forward. 151 
At the same time, however, the Court also stated: 
We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology 
any information regarding the interior of the home that 
could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical "intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area," constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the 
technology in question is not in general public use. 
This assures preservation of that degree of privacy 
against government that existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted. On the basis of this 
criterion, the information obtained by the thermal 
imager in this case was the product of a search. 152 
The Court does not define "general public use" but simply 
notes in a footnote, citing Oraolo, that use of the thermal 
imaging technology was not "routine."153 This is hardly a "clear 
149. Id. at 37-38 (citation omitted). 
150. Id. at 34-35. 
151. Id. at 40 (citation omitted). 
152. Id. at 34-35 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
153. Id. at 39 n.6. 
2013] Back to the Future: United States v. Jones 
specification of those methods of surveillance that require a 
warrant.,,154 Nor does it promote confidence that there indeed is 
a bright line at the entrance to one's home over which police 
may not validly step without a warrant. 155 
Given the rationale of Kyllo, one would expect that technology 
that is commonplace and routinely used by the general public 
can also be used by police without a warrant and without 
implicating the Fourth Amendment. But that "long view" taken 
by the Court in 2001 did not last very long at all. 
III. AND THEN ALONG CAME JONESI56 
Federal agents suspected Antoine Jones of trafficking drugs. 157 
Agents conducted surveillance both visually and with cameras 
fixed on a nightclub owned by Jones. 158 They also relied on a 
pen register and wiretap of his cell phone. 159 Based on the 
information gathered from these sources, the government sought 
and obtained authority to place a Global Positioning System 
(GPS) device on a Jeep Cherokee owned by Jones's wife but 
driven mainly by Jones. 160 The warrant permitted the placement 
of the device on the Cherokee but required that it be done in 
Washington, D.C., and within ten days. 161 Ignoring these 
constraints, on the eleventh day after obtaining the warrant, the 
government placed the device on the Jeep while it was parked 
on a public parking lot in Maryland. 162 The device was placed 
on the undercarriage of the Jeep and remained there for a period 
of 28 days. 163 "By means of signals from multiple satellites, the 
device established the vehicle's location within 50 to 100 feet, 
and communicated that location by cellular phone to a 
Government computer. It relayed more than 2,000 pages of data 
154. Id. at 40. 
155. See id. 
156. "Along Came Jones" is a song written by Jerry Leiber and Mike Stoller and 
originally recorded by The Coasters in 1959. THE COASTERS, ALONG CAME 
JONES (Atco 6141) (1959). 
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over the four-week period."I64 Jones was tried jointly with 
Lawrence Maynard and was convicted. 165 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia 
Circuit, Jones contended that his reasonable expectation of 
privacy was violated by the twenty-four-hour-a-day tracking of 
his movements while in the Jeep. 166 For its part, the 
government, relying on Knotts, contended that there had been no 
search because one has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
while traveling on public roads. 167 Seizing upon language in 
Knotts, the D.C. Court of Appeals found that the type of twenty-
four-hour surveillance involved in Jones's case was expressly 
not addressed in Knotts. 168 
Most important for the present case, the Court [in 
Knotts] specifically reserved the question whether a 
warrant would be required in a case involving "twenty-
four hour surveillance," stating[:] 
if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as 
respondent envisions should eventually occur, 
there will be time enough then to determine 
whether different constitutional principles may be 
applicable. 169 
In other words, the issue reserved in Knotts as unnecessary to 
its holding was "squarely presented" in Jones's case. 170 The 
appellate court took pains to address the difference between the 
prolonged tracking of Jones via GPS, and the mere "movements 
from one place to another" by the government in Knotts.17I The 
court meticulously distinguished the movements of Jones from 
that of Knotts and concluded: 
[W]e hold the whole of a person's movements over the 
course of a month is not actually exposed to the public 
because the likelihood a stranger would observe all 
164. Id. 
165. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 548-49 (D.C. Cir. 2010), a./f'd in part 
sub nom, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
166. Id. at 555. 
167. Id. at 555-56. 
168. Id. at 556-57. 
169. Id. at 556 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983)). 
170. Id. at 558. 
171. Id. at 557. 
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those movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil. 
It is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to 
follow someone during a single journey as he goes to 
the market or returns home from work. It is another 
thing entirely for that stranger to pick up the scent 
again the next day and the day after that, week in and 
week out, dogging his prey until he has identified all 
the places, people, amusements, and chores that make 
up that person's hitherto private routine.172 
In short, the court concluded: "The difference is not one of 
degree but of kind, for no single journey reveals the habits and 
patterns that mark the distinction between a day in the life and a 
way of life .... "173 The court was unconcerned, with good 
reason given the shift from property rights to privacy rights, 
with the government's trespass to lones's property. 174 
Few could have anticipated the outcome of Jones in the 
Supreme Court. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by the 
Government sought review of the lower court's ruling, arguing 
that GPS tracking is not a search at all because one has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in movements made in 
public. 175 The Brief in Opposition to the Government's request 
for certiorari asked that if the Court were to grant review, it also 
consider the question of whether the actual installation of the 
GPS device constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 176 
In support of this, Jones stated, 
In this case, "the police not only engaged in 
surveillance by GPS but also intruded (albeit briefly 
and slightly) on the defendant's personal property, 
namely his car, to install the GPS device on the vehicle 
.... " Just as "squeezing [the] outer surface of a bag" 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search,... the 
172. ld. at 566-59, 560. 
173. ld. at 562. 
174. See id. at 556-58, 563--{)5. 
175. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11-12, United States v. Jones, 615 F.3d 544 
(2011) (No. 10-1259),2011 WL 1462758, at *11-12. 
176. Brief in Opposition at 2, Jones, 615 F.3d 544 (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 
2263361, at *2. 
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government's installation of a device on Jones's 
private vehicle constitutes a search. 177 
[Vol. 42 
The grant of certiorari included the additional issue proposed 
by Jones. 178 In its brief, the Government contended that placing 
the device on Jones's car was not a search because there can be 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of one's 
vehicle. 179 Jones countered, 
The Fourth Amendment protects "property as well as 
privacy." Its protections take account of property law 
concepts not only because they aid in determining 
whether the government has committed a seizure, ... 
but also because they are an important and sometimes 
dispositive consideration in determining whether a 
subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is 
prepared to accept as reasonable. 180 
Clearly, the argument of both parties centered on satisfying 
the two-pronged test of Katz. The references to property rights 
made by Jones were in support of his contention that his 
expectation of privacy was reasonable and did not rely on the 
trespass doctrine. 18l 
Thus, when the Supreme Court ruled in Jones's favor, the 
rationale it relied on in doing so was surprising. 
The Government contends that the Harlan standard 
shows that no search occurred here, since Jones had no 
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in the area of the 
Jeep accessed by Government agents (its underbody) 
and in the locations of the Jeep on the public roads, 
which were visible to all. But we need not address the 
Government's contentions, because Jones's Fourth 
Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz 
formulation. At bottom, we must "assur[ e] 
preservation of that degree of privacy against 
177. Id. 
178. Grant of Certiorari, United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (No. 10-
1259). 
179. Brief for United States at 39, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 
10-1259),2011 WL 3561881, at *20. 
180. Brief for Respondent at 17, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 2011 WL 4479076, at *12. 
(quoting Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992)). 
181. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text. 
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government that existed when the Fourth Amendment 
was adopted." As explained, for most of our history 
the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a 
particular concern for government trespass upon the 
areas ("persons, houses, papers, and effects") it 
enumerates. 182 
At bottom, the Court concluded, "the Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted 
jor, the common-law trespassory test.,,183 The Court made clear 
that its trespass theory did not apply, as contended by Justice 
Alito in his concurrence, to "any technical trespass that led to 
the gathering of evidence."184 Rather, it applies only to 
trespasses to persons, houses, papers, and effects enumerated in 
the Fourth Amendment itself. 185 But while the majority insists 
that "technical" trespasses "don't count," they certainly did 
count when the Amendment was adopted. 186 Recall the opinion 
in Entick, which, ironically, Justice Scalia supportively cites in 
Jones: 
By the laws of England, every invasion of private 
property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man 
can set his foot upon my ground without my license, 
but he is liable to an action, though the damage be 
nothing, which is proved by every declaration in 
trespass where the defendant is called upon to answer 
for bruising the grass and even treading upon the 
soil. 187 
It is unfortunate that the Court chose in Jones not to apply the 
Katz test because today's technology permits continued 
surveillance of one's movements over a long period of time 
without trespassing on one's property or effects. Thus, in those 
types of cases, Jones provides no guidance on the question of 
whether the use of non-trespassory technology would constitute 
182. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (footnote omitted) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). 
183. Id. at 952. 
184. Id. at 953 n.8 (Alito, J., concurring). 
185. Id. 
186. See id. at 949; supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
187. Entick v. Carrington, 95 E.R. 807 (1765) (emphasis added), quoted in Jones, 
132 S. Ct. at 949. 
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a search or seizure. The Court dodged the most important 
question presented in the case: whether intrusive surveillance of 
an individual invades a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Given advances in technology and the amount of information 
about an individual's life such technology can gather and track, 
the answer to that question is critical. Further, there is no 
guidance as to what constitutes a "technical" trespass, which the 
majority seems to suggest would not present a Fourth 
Amendment problem. And finally, the decision provides no 
guidance for police in determining whether they must obtain a 
warrant before using non-trespassory GPS tracking. In short, 
the Court seems only to have kicked the can down the road. 
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF KATZ AND JONES IN THE 21 ST 
CENTURY 
Putting aside for the moment whether the trespass doctrine has 
been alive and well all along in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the fact remains that neither the trespass 
doctrine-relied upon in Jones-nor the expectation of privacy 
doctrine-relied upon in Katz-provides adequate guidance to 
law enforcement units seeking, quite properly, to use ever more 
advancing technology in criminal investigations. Nor does 
either of those tests adequately protect privacy interests of 
citizens subject to those criminal investigations using advanced 
non-tres~assory technology. 188 The latest technology in 
tracking 89 allows police to stay one step ahead of the trespass 
188. Justice Scalia, speaking for the majority in Jones, stated that "[S]ituations 
involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass remain 
subject to Katz analysis. . .. It may be that achieving the same result through 
electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional 
invasion of privacy .... " Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953-54. This recognition that 
searches without trespass remain subject to the Katz legitimate expectation of 
privacy test adds nothing to the debate about what would be considered a 
"legitimate" expectation of privacy in the advanced digital age in which we 
live. 
189. For example, consider, AKELA, THROUGH THE WALL STANDOFF DETECTION 
AND TRACKING OF INDNIDUALS: REpORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (Apr. 30, 2012), available at 
https:llwww.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllnijlgrants/240231.pdf. The report provides a 
summary of the technology that a corporation named AKELA is developing for 
law enforcement use. 
AKELA Inc. developed a sense-through-the-wall (SITW) standoff 
radar imaging system for law enforcement use. The underlying 
technology of the imaging system is a multiple antenna, continuous 
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prohibition while gathering an extraordina2' amount of 
information about a person's private life. 19 Thus, the 
celebratory note struck by several commentators since the 
release of the Jones decision is perplexing. For example, an 
attorney who filed an amicus brief on behalf of Jones referred to 
the Court's decision as a "landmark ruling in applying the 
Fourth Amendment's protections to advances in surveillance 
technology.,,191 It is hardly a "landmark" ruling because the 
Court dodged the critical issue. l92 Instead of reviving the 
trespass doctrine, the facts in Jones provided the Court with an 
opportunity to address a more fundamental concern that will no 
doubt crop up again in the very near future: the effect, if any, 
technology should have on the reasonableness calculation of 
societal expectations of privacy. 
wave, frequency stepping radar in a portable case that can be 
positioned at standoff distances of up to 30 m away from a building 
of interest. Radar information is processed in real time on a laptop 
computer to allow detection and tracking of stationary or moving 
individuals within a building structure. 
The project goals were to provide an easy to use, battery operated, 
FCC compliant, portable system weighing less than 15 Ibs, at a total 
system cost of less than $5,000, that detects personnel behind an 
eight inch thick concrete block wall at a range of 30 meters, is 
capable of being controlled by a wireless Ethernet connection 
allowing remote deployment and operation, and produces images 
identifying stationary and moving individuals within building 
structures. 
fd. at 3. 
190. See, The Drones Are Coming, But Our Laws Aren't Ready, 
http://www.nbcne~s.comltechnology/technologldrones-are-coming-our-Iaws­
arent-ready-I C9006243. 
191. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: Warrants Needed in GPS Tracking, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.comlpolitics/supreme-court-
warrants-needed-in-gps-trackingl20 12/0 1/23/glQAx7qGLO _story.html; see 
also Sherry F. Colb, The Supreme Court Decides the GPS Case, United States 
v. Jones, and the Fourth Amendment Evolves, VERDICT JUSTIA (Feb. 15,2012), 
http://verdict.justia.coml20 12/021 15/the-supreme-court -decides-the-gps-case-
united-states-v-jones-and-the-fourth-amendment-evolves-2. Professor Colb 
states that she feels "optimistic about the future of the Fourth Amendment" 
post-Jones and pointed to the fact that Justices Scalia and Alito both 
"endorse[ d] the 'reasonable expectation of privacy' test," as supporting her 
cause for optimism. fd. 
192. Certainly, if one accepts the notion that the trespass doctrine has never gone out 
of use and has always been available as an arrow in one's Fourth Amendment 
quiver, there is nothing "landmark" about the Jones decision. 
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Justice Sotomayor touched on this in her concurring opinion in 
Jones. She noted: 
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This 
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people 
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to 
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they dial 
or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they 
visit and the e-mail addresses with which they 
correspond to their Internet service providers; and the 
books, groceries, and medications they purchase to 
online retailers. Perhaps, as Justice ALITO notes, 
some people may find the "tradeoff' of privacy for 
convenience "worthwhile," or come to accept this 
"diminution of privacy" as "inevitable," post, at 962, 
and perhaps not. I for one doubt that people would 
accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to 
the Government of a list of every Web site they had 
visited in the last week, or month, or year. But 
whatever the societal expectations, they can attain 
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a 
prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all 
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of 
the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason 
alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 193 
And Justice Alito succinctly explained the dilemma. 
The Katz expectation-of-privacy test ... is not without 
its own difficulties. It involves a degree of circularity, 
and judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of 
privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable 
person to which the Katz test looks. In addition, the 
Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical 
reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set 
of privacy expectations. But technology can change 
those expectations. Dramatic technological change 
193. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, 1., concurring). 
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may lead to periods in which popular expectations are 
in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes 
in popular attitudes. New technology may provide 
increased convenience or security at the expense of 
privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff 
worthwhile. And even if the public does not welcome 
the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, 
they may eventually reconcile themselves to this 
development as inevitable. 194 
The question, it seems, is should the inevitability of advancing 
technology define society's reasonable expectation of privacy? 
Or as Professor Amsterdam so eloquently stated, the question "is 
whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the 
police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, 
the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would 
be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free 
and open society.,,195 If it is inevitable that technology will 
develop x-ray vision glasses that police can wear to see the 
contents of a student's backpack as he walks down the street, or 
the inside of a woman's purse as she walks in public, does this 
mean the student and the woman have no legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the backpack or purse because each is aware of the 
use of such technology by police? If one's legitimate realm of 
privacy is to be dependent upon the type of technology available 
to intrude into that realm, without trespassing, "the [Fourth] 
[A]mendment's benefit would be too stingy to preserve the kind 
of open society to which we are committed and in which the 
[A ]mendment is supposed to function. What kind of society is 
that?,,196 Because the Court based its holding on the resuscitated 
trespass doctrine in Jones, the answer to these questions must 
await another day. 
194. Id. at 962 (Ali to, 1., concurring). 
195. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on The Fourth Amendment, 38 MINN. L. 
REv. 349,403 (1974). 
196. Id.at402. 
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